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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action to recover 
the value of property taken by the State and for severance 
damages to their remaining property, 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On special verdict, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $289.00 for 
the value of the property taken; $578.00 for a temporary con-
struction easement and severance damages in the amount of 
$4,543.00. Judgement for the Plaintiffs totaled $5,410.00. 
Plaintiffs1 motion for additur or in the alternative for a new 
trial was denied. Plaintiffs appealed. 
JURISDICTION 
Appeal is from a final judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err in excluding Plaintiffs1 evidence 
concerning the measure of damages? 
2. Did the Court err in admitting evidence of improper 
elements of damages? 
3. Did the Court err in failing to give Plaintiffs' 
requested Jury instructions? 
4. Was the verdict supported by substantial evidence? 
5. Should the Trial Court have granted a new trial on the 
grounds that the Jury misapprehended and misapplied the law 
concerning valuation of severance damages? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs, the MacQueens, purchased the subject property 
located at 3725 Redwood Road in 1971. (T-4) The MacQueens have 
operated "The Carpet Barn", a retail carpet and floor covering 
outlet, on the property since that time. 3ji. At all times prior 
to the taking, The Carpet Barn and its customers traveling north 
or south on Redwood Road had unrestricted access along the entire 
192 foot frontage of The Carpet Barn property. (Exhibit P-2) 
Prior to the taking, there had been no effort to restrict or 
regulate access to Plaintiffs' property, or to prevent customers 
from utilizing the State's right-of-way in entering and exiting. 
The portion of the Plaintiffs1 property fronting Redwood 
Road contained space for fifteen to twenty parking spaces that 
were used by The Carpet Barn's customers. (T-ll) The only 
customer entrance to the building was located in the front of the 
building immediately adjacent to the customer parking. 
During 1984, the State of Utah, (hereinafter "State") 
entered into negotiations with Plaintiffs to acquire a 3-foot by 
approximately 192-foot strip along the entire frontage of Plain-
tiffs' property. (T-14) When Plaintiffs refused the State's 
initial offer, plans were altered to proceed with the road 
widening without acquiring Plaintiffs' property. (T-20, T-74) 
In the spring of 1985 the State began construction of a retaining 
wall across the front of Plaintiffs' property. (T-15) The wall 
ranged in height from approximately 16 inches to 2 feet and was 
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topped by a 4-foot high chain-link fence. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 
25) It encroached on Plaintiffs1 property approximately six 
inches. (T-292) The only access to Plaintiffs1 property was 
through a 20-foot opening in the curb, wall and fence on the 
southwest corner of the property. (T-96) The minimum require-
ment for commercial driveways is 25 feet. (T-95) This require-
ment is set forth by the State. (T-23) 
The construction of the wall and fence prevented parking in 
front of the property, eliminating approximately 15 to 20 parking 
spaces. The fence and wall also restricted access to Plaintiffs' 
automatic sprinkler system in violation of West Valley City Fire 
Code. (T-102) 
The chain-link fence was removed by the State prior to 
trial. (T-34) The trial court ruled that since the fence had 
been removed, Plaintiffs were prevented from introducing evidence 
regarding the fence. (T-33-34) The Trial Court also prevented 
Plaintiffs from presenting evidence of the size and type of 
access allowed other property owners which was offered to show 
that the access allowed Plaintiffs was unreasonable and adversely 
affected the value of their remaining property. (T-337-340) 
The Trial Court, over Plaintiffs1 objection, allowed the 
State's appraiser, Mr. Lang, to present evidence regarding flcost 
to cure." Part of this evidence included a figure of $4,543.00 
for landscaping the front of Plaintiffs1 building. (T-294) 
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There was no "landscaping1' involved in the taking, nor any 
landscaping on the property at any time prior to the taking. 
(T-293) 
Plaintiffs took exception to the deletion of language in 
Plaintiffs1 proposed instruction nos. 28 and 25 which instructed 
the jury that long use could establish an easement in favor of 
the abutting property owner for use of the right-of-way. (T-341) 
Plaintiffs also took exception to the failure to give Plaintiffs1 
proposed instruction No. 26 regarding Plaintiffs1 unrestricted 
access to the property prior to the taking. (T-342) The court 
also refused to instruct the jury to ignore the State's evidence 
regarding "cost to cure.11 (T-344) 
The jury was instructed that Plaintiffs1 property had been 
taken. (Instruction No. 11) The Jury found that there were 
severance damages to the remaining property not taken; however, 
the amount of severance damages awarded was the precise amount 
the State's appraiser testified he thought would be necessary to 
landscape the front of the property. (T-294) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for additur or in the alternative 
for a new trial based on the jury's failure to follow the law in 
applying the proper formula to calculate severance damages. The 
motion was denied. Plaintiffs appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury misapplied the law in the valuation of severance 
damages. This is evidenced by the fact that the verdict given is 
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not supported by the evidence received at trial. Several evi-
dentiary rulings erroneously excluded evidence offered by 
Plaintiffs and admitted evidence offered by the Defendants con-
tributing to the jury's error. The failure to give Plaintiffs' 
instructions as requested precluded a fair consideration of 
Plaintiffs1 "theory of the case" regarding calculation of sever-
ance damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek an Order: 
1. Remanding the case for recomputation of severance 
damages according to the proper legal standard; 
2. Reversing the lower court's evidentiary rulings as 
outlined herein; and 
3. Reversing the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' requested 
jury instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS 
WITH REGARD TO CALCULATION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
The jury was instructed as to the proper method to be used 
to calculate severance damages. Instruction No. 15, in relevant 
part read: 
You shall consider the value of the remaining 
property before the severance of the part 
acquired and, second, the value of the 
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remaining property after severance. If the 
value of the remaining property after the 
taking is less than the value before the 
taking this reduction in value is to be 
considered as severance damages. 
This instruction translates into a very simple formula that can 
be expressed as: value before (x) - value after (y) = severance 
damages (d). 
In order for the jury to properly award severance damages in 
the amount of $4,543.00 there must be some competent evidence 
presented at trial which established that the portion of the 
property not taken decreased in value $4,543.00 by virtue of the 
taking. A thorough review of the evidence presented at trial 
discloses no evidence which, when properly used to establish 
before and after values of the subject property, could support 
the verdict reached by the jury. 
Plaintiffs, through the testimony of their expert appraiser, 
Mr. Blankenship, established that the value of the property 
before the taking was $225,684.00. The Plaintiffs1 expert 
testified that by the taking of Plaintiffs1 property and con-
struction of a wall, the "highest and best use of the property 
was changed, due to the lack of access and parking in front of 
the property, from commercial to light industrial.11 He testified 
that as a result the value of the property, after the taking, was 
$88,905.00. (T-185) Thus, had the jury adopted the view of the 
evidence presented by Plaintiffs, severance damages would be 
calculated: $225,684.00 - $88,905.00 = $137,778.00. 
Defendants1 appraiser valued the property before the taking 
at $306,000.00, i.e. $80,316.00 higher than the value given by 
Plaintiffs. Then, rather than testifying as to the proper value 
of the property after the taking, Defendants1 expert testified 
that the property, because of the taking, suffered from 
"functional obsolescence11; that is, the property was no longer 
functional for its purpose as a commercial establishment. 
(T-289) The main factor in making this determination was that 
there could no longer be parking in front of the building (id). 
In order to solve the problem of "functional obsolescence," the 
State's appraiser testified that Plaintiffs would have to tear 
down a portion of their building to provide additional access and 
parking. (Id.) His estimated cost to tear down the existing 
portion of the structure and convert it to parking was 
$25,000.00. He testified it would cost $98,000.00 to replace the 
space lost by destruction of the building. However, when asked 
what value he assigned to the property after the taking, he 
replied as follows: 
Q. In light of those facts, on what value then did you 
assign to the property after the taking in question? 
A. I had one other thought. I thought that the front 
should be cleaned up. There's a space between this right-of-way 
line and the building now, which is unusable space. He was using 
that space before for parking. There's some asphalt on it, some 
concrete on it, and there's some gravel on it. That doesn't 
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appeal to the use -- that isn't appealing from a retail use of 
this property. So I thought that that should be planted. We 
talked to a landscaping contractor at Redwood Road Nursery, and 
with his help we came up with the sprinkling system, some not too 
tall of greens, some low of greens, some ground cover, etc., 
soil, removing the asphalt, and removing the concrete so that 
this area in between the right-of-way line and the building could 
be landscaped in some way that he wouldn't have to mow a lawn or 
do something that took a lot of maintenance over the years, and 
improve the look out in the front there. And our estimate for 
that was $4,543.00. So we have, then, curing the front yard 
appearance, $4,543.00, a taking at $3.00 a square foot, 6 inches 
wide, comes to $2.89--
Q. Excuse me. Let me fill in this chart with respect to 
your testimony. Going back to the before value of the land that 
was $211,000; is that correct? 
A. Roughly. 
Q. The value utilized was $95,000? 
A. That's right. 
Q. For a total value before of $306,000; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now let's talk about the value of the land actually 
taken. You've assumed, I guess, a 6 inch taking along the entire 
frontage of the property? 
A. Yes, that's about 96 square foot. 
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Q. And you utilized your figure of $3.00 a square foot? 
A. $3.00. We rounded it to $2.89. 
Q. What did you determine when you mentioned the landscap-
ing? 
A. You want the number? 
Q. $4,543.00? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you make a determination of the value of a 
temporary easement during the course of completion of the im-
provements? 
A. Yes. I felt that a 10 foot wide strip was probably 
utilized there, took the fee simple value of that, assumed that 
it was occupied for a year by the contractor, although it was 
probably less, and took 10 percent rent, which is a land rent 
from the market place, and that came to $578.00 rent. (T-295) 
The figures returned by the jury, as evidenced by the 
special verdict form, are the figures as testified to above by 
Defendants1 witness. Those figures included the cost of the land 
taken, cost of the construction easement, but not the difference 
in value of the property before and after taking, nor even the 
total "cost to cure11 as testified by Defendants' experts 
($25,000.00 + $98,000.00 + $4,543.00 = $127,543.00), but the 
figure listed was only the cost for "curing the front yard 
appearance." (T-294) 
Defendants did not testify, nor did they contend that the 
$4,543.00 represents the difference between the value of the 
property before the taking minus the value after the taking. 
There was no testimony to which the jury could have applied the 
formula x (value before) - y (value after) = d (severance dam-
ages) which would have yielded the result reached. Where the 
jury so clearly misapprehends or misapplies the law, Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a new trial. Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 
17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966). 
II. 
THE JURY VERDICT IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
Since Defendants offered no direct testimony to establish 
the "after" value, the only evidence before the Jury on the 
"after" value was that presented by Plaintiffs1 expert, 
$88,905.00. The "before" values given were $306,000.00 by the 
State and $225,684.00 by the Plaintiffs. In order for the 
verdict to be within the range of testimony offered at trial, it 
must fall within $217,095.00 ($306,000.00 value before -
$88,905.00 value after) and $137,778.00 ($225,864.00 value before 
- $88,905.00 value after). Thus, the verdict returned by the 
Jury, $5,410.00, it is not within the range of testimony 
provided. 
In eminent domain cases, absent a showing of 
passion or prejudice, if the award of compen-
sation was within the estimate of value given 
by one of the expert witnesses, it is sup-
ported by competent evidence and will be 
affirmed. 
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Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 103 (Utah 1984). 
In determining whether the jury verdict falls ,fwithin the esti-
mates of value given by one of the experts" the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413 
P.2d 204 (1966) stated: 
[0]pinion by real estate appraisers on 
"before and after" market values must be 
considered in connection with related facts 
on which they are based, and a satisfactory 
explanation must be given as to how the 
witness arrived at his conclusion. 
Id. at 208 (citing Arkansas State Highway ComirTn v. Ptak, 236 
Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963)). In Chapman the court reversed 
a verdict based on the testimony of an appraiser who based his 
conclusion on inaccurate dimensions and calculations and undevel-
oped reasoning. In this case, the State's appraiser, as a basis 
for valuing the property the same both before and after the 
taking (T-280) stated that he relied on Mr. Beaufort, another 
state witness who had told him that the Plaintiffs did not have 
access across the frontage of the property prior to the taking. 
(T-315) He admitted that his appraisal would change if the 
assumption that Plaintiffs, prior to the taking did not have 
unrestricted access along the front of their property, was 
incorrect. He further admitted the entirety of his appraisal was 
based on that fact. (T-316) The appraiser, Mr. Lang, also 
admitted that if his assumption was incorrect then his appraisal 
was also incorrect. Id. 
Mr. Beaufort, upon whose representation Mr. Lang had based 
his entire appraisal, was asked on cross-examination: 
Q: Do you know of any law, any regulation, any directive, 
that says that a customer of the Carpet Barn parking in 
20 feet of property can't back out onto Redwood Road 
and proceed North or South over the State1s right-of-
way? 
A: If its transversable, I believe there is--there is 
transversable. [sic] There is no law that says you 
cannot do that. 
(T-256) The exhibits submitted at trial show the condition of 
the property with unrestricted access prior to the taking. Mr. 
MacQueen testified that prior to the taking, customers had access 
all along the front of the property for parking. (T-6) The 
State presented no evidence to support the assumption upon which 
Mr. Lang's testimony was based. Mr. Beaufort, whose hearsay 
communication allegedly formed the basis of Mr. Lang's testimony, 
gave testimony at trial inconsistent with the out-of-court 
statement relied on by Lang. Before testimony of an appraiser 
can support a jury verdict the facts upon which it is based must 
be examined to determine if they support his conclusion. See 
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 413 P.2d at 208. In this case, 
the entire basis for Mr. Lang's conclusion was a hearsay state-
ment that was contradicted in court by the declarant of the 
statement and which was unsupported by any other evidence. 
The factual basis for Lang's calculation of the property 
taken and the construction easement are also lacking. As to the 
amount of property actually taken he testified: 
Well, there was a taking of approximately 6 inches in front, 
I'm told by others. I didn't measure it myself. (T-292) 
His testimony as to the value of the construction easement is 
based on unfounded assumptions and is entirely lacking in founda-
tion: 
0. Did you make a determination of the value of a con-
struction easement during the course of completion of 
the improvements? 
A. Yes. I felt that a 10 foot wide strip was probably 
utilized there, took the fee simple value of that, 
assumed that it was occupied for a year by the contrac-
tor, although it was probably less, and took 10 percent 
rent, which is a land rent from the market place, and 
that came to $528.00 rent. 
(T-295) The figures given by the State's appraiser were 
based on speculation and hearsay rather than on personal knowl-
edge. The methods used to calculate damage included improper 
speculative elements of damages such as landscaping, which did 
not properly figure into the value of the property after the 
taking. Therefore, this case is analogous to Chapman. The 
testimony of the State's appraiser is incapable of supporting the 
jury verdict. 
-13-
III. 
THE JURY RELIED ON AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The testimony of Defendant's appraiser as to the severance 
damages was also based on undeveloped reasoning regarding cost to 
cure rather than a calculation of value prior to the taking minus 
the value after the taking. The measure of severance damages 
proposed by Defendant, and adopted by the jury, was not only 
unreasoned, but was an improper measure of damages. 
In Board of Trustees v. B.J. Services, Inc., 75 M.M. 459, 
406 P.2d 171 (1965), there was evidence offered regarding instal-
lation of improvements to the property. The New Mexico court, 
noting that the trial court considered improper elements of 
damages rather than applying the before and after rule, reversed 
the trial court stating: 
[I]t is proper to consider the cost of 
improvements for restoration purposes and 
relocation costs as helpful aids in deter-
mining the difference in the before and after 
value of the property. However, such pro-
spective expenditures are not, themselves, 
proper elements of damage. 
Id. at 172 (citing Arkansas State Highway ComnTn v. Speck, 230 
Ark. 712, 324 S.W.2d 796 (1959); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. 
Ptak, 236 Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963); 4 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain p. 657.) In reversing the lower court the New Mexico 
Supreme Court stated: "Lacking essential findings on the before 
and after values of the property as a whole, the decision cannot 
stand." Iji. at 173. In the case at bar, the jury's findings of 
$4,543.00 in severance damages cannot stand since it was not 
based on any determination of the value of the property prior and 
subsequent to the taking, but reflected only the cost of 
improving the front of Plaintiffs' property which, by itself, is 
not a proper measure of damages. Board of Trustees v. B.J. 
Services, Inc., 406 P.2d at 172. 
In Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 
(Utah 1979) , this Court reversed an earlier line of cases to 
eradicate the kind of error brought about by the kind of testi-
mony offered by Defendants in this case. In Rayco the State 
condemned a 60-foot strip to widen 12th Street in Ogden and 
provide a drainage easement. The taking resulted in the loss of 
more than 50^ of the prime parking directly in front of a super-
market. As a result, the business was transformed into a non-
conforming use and the supermarket building was a misplaced 
improvement, there being insufficient parking to conduct that 
kind of business. The State put on evidence that to correct the 
situation the supermarket should buy an additional piece of 
property and transform it into parking to replace the space lost 
in the taking. The State's estimate of severance damages, which 
was adopted by the jury, was based on the cost of acquiring 
additional land and transforming the area to the side of Plain-
tiffs' building into parking. 
The trial court assessed damages according to the State's 
evidence of the "cost to cure." In reversing the decision this 
Court stated: "The proper measure of severance damages to the 
remainder is the difference between the fair cash market value 
before and after the taking." JA. at 489 (citing State v. 
Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 321, 366 P.2d 76 (1961)). The 
condemnee was not forced to replace his front yard with his back 
yard, 599 P.2d at 490. In rejecting the replacement theory the 
court noted that it did not follow the statutory standard set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 since that theory, in effect, 
limited damages to the fair market value of the land condemned. 
Id. at 487. 
The testimony offered by the State in this case was nearly 
identical to that rejected by the court in Rayco. In this case 
the taking eliminated all Plaintiffs1 prime parking in front of 
his building, thus making his building unfit for its purpose as a 
retail establishment, making it in effect, a "misplaced improve-
ment," or a non-conforming use of the property. The State 
offered testimony that Plaintiffs could acquire additional 
parking to remedy the situation by tearing down a portion of 
their building and creating a parking lot along one side. Then 
almost as an afterthought, the State added the cost of land-
scaping the front of the building. However, unlike Rayco, the 
State listed only the cost of landscaping as the total severance 
damages caused by the taking. The measure of damages offered by 
the State did not include the entire "cost to cure;" which, if 
calculated from the testimony of the State's own expert would in-
clude $25,000.00 (to demolish the existing structure and convert 
it to parking) plus $98,000.00 (to replace on Plaintiffs1 own 
property the portion of the structure demolished) plus $4,543.00 
(to plant "some not too tall of greens, some low of greens, some 
ground cover, etc.n) for a total of $127,534.00. Thus, even if 
the court were to allow the type of testimony which was rejected 
in Rayco, and which was objected to by Plaintiffs in this case; 
and even if the jury were to be allowed to calculate damages on a 
theory that was not only improper under the facts of the case, 
but on which they were not instructed, the award in this case-
must be rejected as inadequate and Plaintiffs1 Motion for Additur 
should be granted so that Plaintiffs are placed in as good a 
financial position as they were in before the taking. State Road 
Comm'n v. Noble, 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957). 
IV. 
THE STATE'S ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES DOES 
NOT CONSIDER ALL PROPER ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE 
In a case similar to this case, Defnet Land and Investment 
Co. v. State, 103 Ariz. 388, 442 P.2d 835 (1968), the Arizona 
Supreme Court rejected the testimony of the State's expert, even 
though it had not been objected to below stating: M0rdinarily, 
we would not consider a claim of error where the trial court was 
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not given the opportunity to correct the error prior to the 
appeal, but the method of evaluation by the appraisers for the 
State is so fundamentally unfair and unjust as to permit of no 
other conclusion that a retrial of the cause is required." Id. 
at 837. In Defnet, the condemneefs property had 2,000 feet of 
direct access to the highway. The State took a strip along the 
front of Plaintiff's property and fenced him off from the high-
way. This changed the highest and best use of the property from 
commercial to residential. The State's expert testified that the 
property was not damaged by fencing off the right-of-way since, 
although the access was different, he believed it was adequate 
for its purpose as residential property. The Arizona Court, 
after recognizing that loss of access was a damage to property 
that must be compensated, stated: 
If the substantial access was adequate for 
the land's highest and best use as homesites 
after the taking, this does not answer the 
fundamental question which the jury had to 
resolve-that is, what was the market value of 
the property after the taking measured by its 
highest and best use as if it had the same 
access which it had prior to the taking. We 
are compelled to agree that the basic concept 
of the State's measure of damages is wholly 
incorrect and its acceptance by the jury can 
be nothing less than fundamental error. 
Id. at 838. In the case at bar the State's appraiser likewise 
testified that the property was not damaged by the change in 
access since the 20-foot driveway provided "adequate access." 
Yet his testimony did not take into consideration that the 
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"highest and best use" of the property, which before had been 
commercial, had been changed by the taking of the parking in 
front of the building to something less than commercial according 
to the State (T-277-78) or to fflight industrial11 according to 
Plaintiffs' expert. (T-159) The State's evidence was contradic-
tory, while it was testified that there was no damage resulting 
from the change of access, Mr. Beauford, one of the State's 
witness, testified that the access was "unreasonable" (T-285) and 
the State's appraiser testified that the building was no longer 
fit for its purpose as a retail establishment. (T-288-89) 
The measure of damages suggested by the State included 
improper factors, such as the cost to landscape and the cost to 
create additional parking. Proper elements of damage such as the 
loss of access and change in the highest and best use were 
ignored. 
Severance damages must be determined by considering the 
"highest and best use" of the property. Deprivation of access is 
a factor that must be considered in calculation of those damages. 
See Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). 
The evidence offered by the State as to the cost to landscape the 
property was not a proper measure of damages. The methodology 
used by Defendants' appraiser to calculate damages was specifi-
cally rejected by this court in Rayco. Therefore, the measure 
used by the State's expert to determine damage was "wholly 
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incorrect and its acceptance by the jury can be nothing less than 
fundamental error." Rayco, 442 P.2d at 838, 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE PLAINTIFFS1 REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
The failure to give portions of Plaintiffs1 Instructions No. 
25 and 28, as well as failure to give Plaintiffs1 Instruction No. 
26, prevented the jury from considering the Plaintiffs1 theory on 
valuation of severance damages. 
The purpose of instructions to the jury is to 
inform them as to the law applicable to the 
evidence and enable them to resolve the 
issues in dispute. To that end, what each 
party is entitled to is to have instructions 
given as to his evidence and his theory of 
the case. 
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiffs1 theory of the case, as represented by the 
testimony of their expert witnesses, was that the Carpet Barn 
property, prior to the taking, had storefront parking along the 
entire length of the property. Access to this parking on Plain-
tiffs' property was unrestricted at all points along the entire 
frontage of the property. Therefore, the proper method for the 
jury to calculate severance damages was to find the value of the 
property at its highest and best use in the condition it was in 
prior to the taking, that is, with storefront parking and unre-
stricted access; then, to find the value of the property at the 
highest and best use after the taking. Plaintiffs' proposed 
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Instruction No. 26 read: "You are instructed that the evidence in 
this case is that the State of Utah did not attempt, in any way, 
to restrict highway access of the Carpet Barn property until 
August, 1985." This instruction was necessary to give the jury a 
starting point to calculate severance damages under Plaintiffs1 
theory of the case. This instruction was also necessary for the 
jury to properly utilize Instructions Nos. 18, 20 and 21 which 
read: 
Instruction No. 18: 
You are instructed that the law recognizes 
that a landowner whose property fronts on a 
public highway has a right of reasonable 
access to the highway. 
Instruction No. 20: 
The State has authority to adopt and enforce 
regulations governing the use of and access 
to public highway rights of way, including 
regulations governing the location, number 
and width of driveways providing access to 
and from adjoining land. However, the State 
is prohibited by law from exercising this 
authority in a way that unreasonably inter-
feres with or impairs an established right of 
ingress and egress to property adjoining a 
public highway. 
Where an owner of adjoining land has 
rights of ingress and egress to a public 
highway and those rights are unreasonably 
impaired by the adoption of State regulations 
or the enforcement of those regulations, that 
owner is entitled to just compensation by way 
of severance damages for the unreasonable 
restriction of his right of access. 
Instruction No. 21: 
The rights of access, light, and air are 
easements appurtenant to the land of an 
abutting owner on a street; they constitute 
property rights forming part of the owner's 
estate. These substantial property rights, 
although subject to reasonable regulation, 
may not be taken away or unreasonably im-
paired by the State without the payment of 
just compensation. 
Where, in connection with an actual taking 
of an abutting property owner's property, the 
erection of a permanent structure as a part 
of a public highway results in the impairment 
of or damage to the abutting property owner's 
easements of access, light, and air, that 
damage or impairment are relevant factors 
properly considered in determining severance 
damages. 
Without Plaintiffs1 proffered Instruction No. 26, the jury 
had no starting point from which to calculate damages. Without 
guidance as to what Plaintiffs1 rights were prior to the taking 
there is no way that the jury can properly calculate the effect 
the taking had upon those rights and, as they were instructed to 
do, utilize this as a factor in calculating severance damages. 
This error was compounded by the exclusion of Plaintiffs1 
evidence regarding the access allowed other businesses in the 
area to establish what a reasonable restriction of access would 
amount to. The net result was that although the jury was in-
structed to calculate damages based on the use of the property 
before and after the taking, they were given no guidance as to 
what Plaintiffs' rights were prior to the taking and no basis for 
comparison as to what their access rights would be following a 
"reasonable restriction." Therefore, the key element of Plain-
tiffs' damage, the change in the highest and best use of the 
property after restriction of its access and the elimination of 
its storefront parking, was not properly presented to the jury 
for consideration. This problem was exacerbated by the court's 
elimination of language in Plaintiffs1 proffered Instructions 
Nos. 25 and 28 which indicated that Plaintiffs1 rights to access 
and easement for light, air and access, could be "established by 
long term use or travel." (Compare instructions as given with 
Plaintiffs' proffered instructions (Addendum pages 1, 2)) 
The effect of the elimination of this language was not only 
to deny Plaintiffs1 instructions as to their "theory of the case" 
but also to deny them the full benefit they were entitled to from 
the instructions that were given. 
Jury instructions must be read as a whole. Black v. 
McKnight, 562 P.2d 623 (Utah 1977). Although the portions of the 
instructions not given were not of great length, they, along with 
Instruction No. 26 were critical to Plaintiffs1 theory of the 
case. The failure to give Plaintiffs1 Instructions Nos. 25, 26 
and 28 as requested made it impossible for the jury to properly 
apply Instructions Nos. 18, 20, 21 and 22 regarding calculation 
of damages. 
Plaintiffs1 right to have the jury instructed as to their 
theory of the case is well recognized. Elkington v. Foust, 618 
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977); State Bank of Beaver County v. 
Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P.2d. 612 (1933). In the instant 
case the instructions, when taken as a whole, lacked the critical 
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elements to properly place Plaintiffs1 theory of the case before 
the jury. 
VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY 
ON IMPROPER ELEMENTS OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
The case at bar presented the jury with two very narrow 
issues to determine; first, the value of the land taken, and 
second, the damages to the remaining property. See Instruction 
No. 9. The jury was instructed to determine the value of the 
land before the taking and the value of the land subsequent to 
the taking. The difference in these amounts, the reduction in 
the value of the property as a result of the taking, was to be 
considered severance damages. See Instruction No. 15. The 
evidence objected to by Plaintiffs concerned the cost to land-
scape the portion of Plaintiffs1 property that they had previous-
ly used as parking. MSuch prospective expenditures are not, 
themselves, proper elements of damage.11 Board of Trustees v. B. 
J. Services, Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 P.2d 171 (1965). 
It was error for the Court to allow Defendants to offer 
testimony which went to an improper element of damage. Under the 
only theory of damages on which the jury was instructed, x (value 
before) - y (value after) = d (severance damages), the evidence 
of landscaping had no place in the equation. It was not relevant 
to the value prior to the taking. It was not used in determining 
the value after the taking, but, as shown from the testimony of 
the State's appraiser (T-294) was offered and calculated as an 
element of damage. This error was prejudicial. An error in the 
admission of evidence is prejudicial when it impacts the outcome 
of the case. Hillyard v. Utah By-products, Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 
263 P.2d 287 (1953). 
The testimony received in error improperly listed land-
scaping as an element of damage. The value of this element 
listed was $4,543.00 (T-294). The amount of severance damages 
found by the jury was $4,543.00. One need not invade the 
sanctity of the jury's deliberations to conclude that the evi-
dence erroneously received impacted the decision to the prejudice 
of Plaintiffs. 
VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
OF THE CHAIN LINK FENCE 
The State, in constructing the retaining wall which en-
croached on Plaintiffs' property, included a chain link fence on 
top of the wall which prevented access to Plaintiffs' property at 
any point outside of the 20-foot drive strip. (T-36) The fence 
was removed by the State prior to trial. (T-34) In calculating 
Plaintiffs' severance damages using the before and after method, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to show the value of the property at its 
highest and best use as of the date of the taking. United States 
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v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942), Reh den 318 U.S. 798 (1943); See 
generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §152 (1966). 
In this case Plaintiffs were denied this opportunity to 
present evidence regarding the fence and the negative impact it 
had on the value of their property. (T-34) As a result, they 
were not placed in as good a financial position as they would 
have been had there had been no taking. State Road Comm'n v. 
Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957). The exclusion of this 
evidence denied the Plaintiffs the benefit of having the jury 
consider their fullest measure of damages. Thus the Plaintiffs 
were denied "just compensation." Utah Const. Art. I, §22. 
VIII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF 
ACCESS ALLOWED OTHER COMPARABLE PROPERTIES 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1987), Plaintiffs are 
entitled to damages based on the difference in the value of the 
property before and after the taking. The "reasonableness11 of 
the access allowed is relevant only as it affects the value of 
the property after the taking. 
Plaintiffs offered evidence of the access allowed to other 
commercial properties in the vicinity in order to give the jury a 
basis to decide whether the access provided Plaintiffs, one 
20-foot driveway, was reasonable access for a commercial proper-
ty. The Court excluded this evidence, leaving the jury with the 
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task of determining what "reasonable access" was with no basis 
for comparison. Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the exclusion 
because a major element of severance damage was that the limita-
tion of access changed the highest and best use of the property 
from commercial to light industrial. Without any proper guide-
line to determine what constituted "reasonable access" for 
commercial property the jury could not properly determine how the 
change in access affected the value of the property. 
IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Following the return of the verdict, Plaintiffs moved to 
have the Court supplement or set aside the award on the grounds 
that the verdict was based on a fundamental misunderstanding or 
misapplication of law. Where it clearly appears that the jury 
has refused to accept credible uncontradicted evidence or has 
misapplied or ignored the law, it is both the prerogative and the 
duty of the Court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. 
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966). In this case, there was no competent evidence received 
by the Court which, when properly applied under the instructions 
given, would justify the verdict returned by the jury. 
The testimony regarding landscaping improvements was not 
relevant as to the fair market value of the property and was not 
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a proper element to be considered in calculating severance 
damages. Board of Trustees v. B. J. Services, Inc., 406 P.2d at 
172. The fact that the jury found severance damages in an amount 
identical to the estimated landscaping costs indicates that the 
jury misunderstood the principles of law used in determining 
severance damages as set forth in Instruction No. 18 and further, 
misapplied that law to the testimony of Mr. Lang regarding 
landscaping improvements. 
In awarding the landscaping costs as severance damages, the 
jury clearly misinterpreted and misapplied the law with regard to 
determining severance damages and the trial court should have 
corrected the error below by granting a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Several prejudicial errors were made at trial, any one of 
which is grounds for reversal. The exclusion of evidence con-
cerning the chain link fence prevented the jury from considering 
the full measure of damages suffered by the Plaintiffs. Exclu-
sion of evidence regarding the access provided similar commercial 
properties prevented any reasoned determination of what effect 
the change in access had on the highest and best use of the 
property, which was a critical element of Plaintiffs' damages. 
The admission of evidence regarding an improper element of 
damages, landscaping, led the jury into an improper calculation 
of severance damages. The failure to give Plaintiffs1 
instructions as requested prevented the jury from properly con-
sidering Plaintiffs1 theory of the case. 
The individual and cumulative effect of these errors was the 
return of a verdict that was unsupported by any substantial 
evidence and which could not have been reached through the proper 
application of the law. Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court 
that the verdict of the lower court be reversed and the case 
remanded for proper determination of Plaintiffs1 severance 
damages. In the alternative Plaintiffs request a finding that 
the only proper evidence offered at trial on the issue of sever-
ance damages was that offered by Plaintiffs and that the verdict 
be amended to reflect the damages Plaintiffs proved at trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1988. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellants 
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Addendum 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations 
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way, 
including regulations governing the location, number and width of 
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land. However, 
the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in 
a way that unreasonably interferes with or impairs an established 
right of ingress and egress to property adjoining a public 
highway. 
Whereas an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and 
egress to a public highway established by long-time use or travel 
and those rights are unreasonably impaired by the adoption of 
State regulations or the enforcement of those regulations, that 
owner is entitled to just compensation by way of severance 
damages for the unreasonable restriction of his right of access. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
The rights of access, light and air are easements appurte-
nant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they consti-
tute property rights forming part of the owner's estate. These 
substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable 
regulation, may not be taken away or impaired by the State 
without the payment of just compensation. 
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting 
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure 
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or 
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access, 
light, and air established by long-time travel or use, that 
damage or impairment are relevant factors property considered in 
determining severance damages. 
Utah State Road Commission vs. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 
1974); 
Utah Road Commission vs. 
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 
P.2d 917 (1963). 
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